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DENMARK’S NEGOTIATED ECONOMYi
 
The political economy of Denmark is of particularly interest in the contemporary debate on small 
advanced industrial states and their capacity to react to changes in the international context, economic and 
otherwise. As a small nation with a population of 5.2 million people, Denmark sits with the most prosperous 
nations of the world and has done so for more than 35 years. Its economy rests on high wages, narrow 
income disparities, investment in skills and education, and high levels of taxation to fund an advanced 
welfare state. Compared with other small countries like Sweden and Norway, Danish political history is 
characterized by a number of distinct traits. First, a long history of lost wars and territories carving into the 
public mind a sense of national vulnerability (see Kaspersen in this volume) making it possible for elites to 
implement national identity policies and to establish a homogenous demos based on a common 
understanding of national identity (see Korsgaard in this volume). Secondly, a long history of state authority 
being centralized in the hands of a small elite enabling the elite to build up capacities (resources and 
legitimacy) to rule the country based on national strategies and interests (see Østergaard in this volume). 
Thirdly, a history of being a small and open economy emphasizing the need for politicians to base their 
conflicts on a politics of pragmatism rather than on a politics of ideals or ideologies (see Rasmussen in this 
volume). Fourthly, a political culture marked by institutionalized class cooperation and a high proportion of 
organized wage earners (Wallerstein and Western 2000) creating possibilities for governments and peak 
organizations to institutionalize macro policy concertation in the form of routinized bargaining (Pedersen 
1993). 
Based on these distinct traits derived from the long history of Denmark a new institutional order emerged 
in the course of post-war developments (Kjær and Pedersen 2001; Jørgensen 2002). In a number of policy 
areas the organizing principles shifted from those of either a mixed or market economy to those of a 
negotiated economy (Kjær and Pedersen 2001; Nielsen and Pedersen 1996; Pedersen 1993). Whereas both 
the mixed and market economy are based on a clear division of labor between the sovereign state and an 
autonomous market, the negotiated economy entails political and economic processes and relations that are 
neither strictly public nor private but are situated between public authority and private autonomy. Thus, the 
negotiated economy became a system of governance where economic coordination is achieved through 
organized negotiations among autonomous actors in both the public and the private sector. At one level, 
Denmark developed governance through the decentralization of decision making and the spread of 
autonomy and authority across private and public institutions.  At another level Denmark remained 
committed to policymaking through negotiations and trust in collective solidarities (Amin and Thomas 1996). 
This paper will describe the negotiated economy as a generalized political system of negotiations 
(Crouch 1990; Marin 1990, 1996) where adjustments to international challenges are an everyday feature of 
the system. It will be emphasized that a negotiated economy is characterized by a combination of 
institutionalized learning and organized negotiations and that the learning capacity of the system is 
influenced by the articulation of a shared and mutual understanding of Denmark’s socioeconomic problems. 
It will also be shown that the flexibility of the economy is influenced by the gradual development of a 
generalized political system of negotiations as an evolutionary form of governance. 
The generalized system can be seen as the institutional precondition for a negotiated economy and a 
negotiated economy, then, will be defined as a structuring of society where an essential part of the allocation 
of resources is conducted through organized negotiations between independent decision making centres in 
the public sector, private interest organizations and financial institutions, including the central bank. Unlike 
decisions made by public authorities, negotiation-based economic decisions are reached on the basis of 
interaction between independent agents, and the relevant public authority is just one of several participants. 
Unlike market decisions, which are made by individual agents acting on the basis of given preferences and 
resources, negotiation-based economic decisions are made through a process characterised by the 
deliberate shaping of preferences. And unlike mixed economies where action is taken by sovereign market 
agents precluded or followed by supplementary or corrective measures by the state, in a negotiation-based 
economy decisions are made in a generalized political system of negotiations where the deliberate shaping 
of preferences and the mutual understanding of socioeconomic problems put limits to and set targets for 
multiple arenas of negotiations between public as well as private, and centralized as well as decentralized 
collective actors. 
In Denmark, negotiations have been - and still are - widely used as instruments for decision making in 
relation to both allocation and (re) distribution. The classical example is the labor market. Wages, working 
hours, and other conditions of work are generally determined by individual market agents and by legislation, 
as well as through organized negotiations – at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level – between collective 
organizations (Nielsen and Pedersen 1991). In the Danish case negotiation appears as an appropriate 
instrument for solving conflicts of interest, especially because none of the involved social partners are in full 
control of the implementation due to the spread of autonomy and authority across private and public 
institutions. This is also because none of the partners are able to choose exit as an option due to the long 
history of institutionalized class cooperation in the labor market and cross-party coalition making in 
Parliament. Thus, negotiation is not only an instrument to resolve conflicts; it is also an instrument for 
achieving mutual understanding. It is not only a technique for decision-making; it also involves 
communication, learning and the development of a shared mutual meaning of Denmark’s socioeconomic 
problems. 
In the following the Danish case of a negotiated economy will be presented. The objective is to show 
how organized negotiations and institutionalized learning (Cox 2001; Hall 1993) are used as instruments to 
handle the changing conditions in European and global markets while recreating national political structures 
in a flexible way. The key point is that the development of a particular socioeconomic discourse and the 
founding of a generalized system of negotiations facilitate collective learning and policy flexibility. It will be 
argued that the Danish case is of special importance for the theory of corporatism because it shows that 
during the 1980s and 1990s the post-war neo-corporatist wage and incomes policy bargaining system, so 
aptly described by Peter Katzenstein (1985) and others (Schmitter 1974, 1982; Therborn 1998), was 
adapted rather than undermined (Molina and Rhodes 2002). It will also be argued that the Danish case is of 
importance for comparative political economy because it shows how an important and often neglected case 
of policy learning and flexibility occurs, and points to some of the conditions that facilitate that learning and 
flexibility (Hemerijck and Schludi 2000, Teague 2000, Katzenstein 2002). Finally it will be argued that the 
Danish case is especially well chosen for highlighting the discursive as well as the governance side of 
institutions (Campbell and Pedersen 1996). 
DISCURSIVE PREREQUISITES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZED LEARNING 
 How a socioeconomic discourse is institutionalized in Danish politics is important because this discourse 
contributes to the mixture of high learning capacity and consensus making that has enabled Denmark to 
adjust so well to shifting international economic currents. The particular Danish economic discourse is built 
around the ongoing deliberative process of establishing a common understanding of socioeconomic 
problems. While macroeconomic phenomenon, such as inflation, deficits, productivity, growth, 
unemployment, are objective in the sense that they can be demonstrated by economic statistics and by 
social events, in contrast socioeconomic problems are subjective given that they are based on 
interpretations of statistics and perceptions of events. But even if interpretations are subjective and based on 
individual interests in the first place, they are not exogenous forces with autonomous causal powers. Rather 
than being exotic to existing frames of meaning they are formed by a discourse that structures in advance 
actors’ experiences of macroeconomic phenomenon and set frames for what counts as a socioeconomic 
problem in the first place and an appropriate interest (individual or common) in the second (Kögler 1999). 
Hence, even if socioeconomic problems are based on objective economic phenomenon they are framed by 
discourse and formed into perceptions of individual as well as common interests.  
 This discourse is a particular Danish understanding of the Keynesian paradigm built around an ideal 
conception of socioeconomic balance through negotiated coordination of policies among various 
autonomous actors in the national economy. It constitutes a blend of liberal and social democratic principles. 
It is liberal in the sense that it respects the autonomy of economic actors and organized interests; it 
downplays direct state intervention into the economy, preferring negotiated settlements instead; and it views 
the Danish economy as an open economy that is exposed to international competition that must find ways to 
become and remain internationally competitive. It is social democratic in the sense that it portrays the 
national economy as a “community of fate” of a multiplicity of social interests, and attempts to secure the 
interests of the whole by inducing the parts to act responsibly with respect to the overall socioeconomic 
balance (Pedersen 1999). To illustrate briefly, the gradual articulation and stabilization of this discourse is 
reflected in three overlapping phases of policy articulation and institution building in the post-war period 
(Pedersen 1993; Kjær and Pedersen 2001) by which not only a particular Danish reading of the Keynesian 
paradigm was created but also a set of complementary institutions was developed.  
 First, from 1945 through the 1960s there was a period during which wage formation and labor markets 
were of concern. In this phase, the key problem of the Danish economy was conceptualized not only as a 
problem of macroeconomic management but also as one of socioeconomic coordination between wage 
formation and the overall development of the national economy. Wage structures and labor markets, it was 
believed, needed to be maintained in ways that better facilitated economic growth. In this view responsibility 
for economic coordination lay both with the state and with the peak organizations in the Danish labor market. 
This problem of coordination was articulated in a series of public investigations and official blueprints that 
defined labor market organizations as being responsible for the resolution of the wage and labor market 
coordination problem but also emphasized the autonomous status of these organizations thus pointing to the 
need for voluntary coordination and mutual restraint in the labor market. From the early 1960s, there was 
gradual organization building in relation to this coordination problem. A complementary set of negotiation and 
arbitration organizations was established and an Economic Advisory Council (EAC) of economic experts was 
designed to create a common awareness of coordination problems in the economy. The biannual wage 
negotiations between employer federations and the trade unions were to become negotiation organizations 
and arbitration organizations and the EAC became the first example of a campaign organization with the 
purpose of communicating socioeconomic conceptions to the broader public and to engage in processes of 
persuasion to create focus on particular socioeconomic problems in order to get them onto the political 
agenda and the agenda of negotiations between labor and capital. There was also experimentation with 
active labor market and incomes policies that became stable parts of Danish economic policy making during 
the 1970s mainly based on proposals formulated by the EAC and implemented through negotiation and 
arbitration organizations. 
 Second, from the 1970s through the 1980s there was concern with the increasing size and growth of the 
public sector. This problem was first articulated by public commissions in two major reports on long term 
planning in 1971 and 1973 and was further articulated in later publications from the Ministry of Finance 
(Finansministeriet 1971, 1972). From the 1950s public commissions were the major arena for political 
exchange between governments, trade unions and employers associations. Since then, tri-partite public 
commissions developed as the ideal type of policy organization where socioeconomic problems were 
identified and related to particular policies (e.g., social security, training and education) and general 
guidelines for their resolution were formulated.  From the 1960s to the 1970s public commissions called for 
the founding of welfare measures and the creation of a welfare state. From the 1970s the increasing public 
sector became the most important problem and commissions called for a significant degree of public sector 
decentralization by granting the municipalities responsibility for a constantly growing part of public 
expenditures. The question was how to ensure fiscally responsible municipalities while maintaining their 
autonomous status vis-à-vis the national government. This was resolved by defining public expenditures as a 
problem and gradually institutionalizing this idea through the creation and use by the state of new economic 
models and budgetary systems, and through the creation of a system of budget negotiations between the 
Ministry of Finance and the municipalities that was governed by the goal of limiting total public expenditures. 
This system was implemented during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 Third, beginning in the mid-1970s, Danish economic problems were conceptualized as stemming from 
the structure of the Danish economy itself.  The structural problem entailed a concern with the 
competitiveness of the national economy, a preoccupation with the supply side (i.e., the conditions of 
production rather than demand and consumption), and a focus on structural as opposed to conjunctural 
barriers to competitiveness. Initially, the competitiveness problem was viewed as having to do with a large 
public sector that put severe constraints on the cost-competitiveness of exporting firms. However, it gradually 
came to be associated with a number of problems inherent in the structure and organization of the private 
sector, such as low levels of technological development and an inability of firms to adequately adapt and 
innovate. During the 1980s analytical units in The Ministry of Finance and The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
formulated this change in the overall understanding of socioeconomic problems. These units came to 
function as discourse organizations with the purpose of creating the theoretical and empirical discourse of 
socioeconomic problem solving through the development of socioeconomic models and statistics that could 
depict and predict causal relations and dependencies in the economy as a systematic basis for the ongoing 
identification of socioeconomic problems. From the 1980s a more coherent structural policy framework was 
articulated that first involved industrial policy and later public expenditure policy. The emergent conception of 
structural policy was one that emphasized the continuous and voluntary restructuring of the Danish economy 
through the creation of various private and public policy-making and implementing bodies. Linking industrial, 
labor market, education and public administration issue-areas through negotiations gradually institutionalized 
this approach. 
 So, whereas policy formation and implementation in both market and mixed economies are centred on 
state hierarchy, notably the legislature and the executive branches, in the Danish case a more complex set 
of complementary institutions were developed. Policy organizations (e.g., public commissions) identified 
socioeconomic problems, related them to particular policies (e.g., wage or labor market policy problems) and 
formulated general guidelines for their resolution. Campaign organizations (e.g., the Economic Advisory 
Council) communicated socioeconomic conceptions to the broader public and engaged in processes of 
persuasion to create a focus on particular socioeconomic problems in order to get them on the political 
agenda. Discourse organizations (e.g., analytical units in the Ministry of Finance and universities) created 
the theoretical and empirical language of socioeconomic problems and negotiation.  And arbitration 
organizations (e.g., the biannual wage negotiations between employer federations and the organizations of 
labor) facilitated policy negotiations, adjudicated settlements and resolved disputes. In this set of 
complementary organizations a shared socioeconomic discourse was gradually articulated enabling 
governments, trade unions and employers associations to interpret macroeconomic phenomenona as 
socioeconomic problems; to formulate policy frames and to enter into negotiations that entailed problem 
solving via institutionalized learning. Policy formulation and campaigning were to become major elements in 
a generalized political system where negotiations mixed power; persuasion and learning in a hybrid way 
without automatic recourse to authoritative state intervention (Mansbridge 1992). 
STRUCTURAL POLICY: A POLITICAL PROJECT 
 The development of a structural policy in the last 20 years is one of the most conspicuous aspects of 
modern Danish economic policy making (Kjær and Pedersen 2001). What began as a complement to 
existing forms of policy and policy making has gradually come to constitute an overarching political project 
and a generalized political system of negotiations in the context of which policies and institutional 
arrangements are positioned, given meaning and coordinated through negotiations. So far, I have 
emphasized the structural elements of a negotiated economy. In the following the evolutionary aspect of a 
negotiated economy will be underlined. I will describe the process through which a structural policy was 
developed in terms of policy formation and institutionalization. The changing institutional order of structural 
policy will be illustrated and the emergence of a generalized political system of negotiations linking different 
issue-areas will be identified.  
 Danish economic policymaking was traditionally viewed as involving a trade-off between employment 
and balanced budgets that could be solved through the management of aggregate demand. In this 
perspective economic imbalance first and foremost reflected conjunctural trends in the economy, notably 
vacillation in the business cycle that could be dealt with effectively through fiscal or incomes policies. 
However, following the first oil crisis in the later half of the 1970s this conjunctural interpretation of the 
economic crisis was challenged by a view that stressed that Denmark’s economic problems were rooted in 
the structure of the economy itself. This structural conception was formulated in response to the evident 
failure of various short-term and demand oriented policy responses to the international recession. In 
particular, several actors, including organized labor and the Danish Federation of Industry, saw the problems 
of crisis management as an expression of structural problems on the supply side rather than on the demand 
side of the Danish economy. Whereas labor saw the problem as having to do with the basic organization and 
orientation of Danish industry, the Federation of Industry viewed the problem as stemming from the 
constraints on export oriented firms caused by a large public sector that tended to favor industries oriented 
primarily towards domestic markets. As a result, labor called for stronger industrial policy, but capital called 
for wage restraint and public expenditure policies designed to improve the international competitiveness of 
Danish industry. The key implication of the debate, however, was a common focus on structural problems in 
the national economy and a common linking of macroeconomic problems and problems of industrial 
competitiveness (Pedersen et al. 1992). 
 As it turned out, the formulation of a more structural view of the problems of Danish industry led quickly 
to a revitalization of industrial policy, which was now seen as a tool for socioeconomic reconstruction. This 
led to attempts to formulate a technology policy aimed at improving the technological competitiveness of 
Danish firms through programs targeted at particular industries or technologies, or at public-private 
cooperation in the area of technological development. In the technology policy interpretation of structural 
problems, the key problem was the low level of technological development in industry, partly due to the small 
size and limited financial strength of Danish firms. The key actors in developing this interpretation were policy 
organizations within the Ministry of Industry and the network of public and semi-public discourse 
organizations (research and development (R&D) organizations) under the auspices of the Ministry. Inside the 
policy organizations but outside the discourse organizations both the Federation of Industry and organized 
labor represented by LO were involved in a number of conflicts together with major political parties (the 
Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party) about how to organize research and 
interpret research results. Main conflicts were on the subject of the overall strategy. Industry together with 
the Liberal Party wanted the strategy to be based on liberal principles not targeting particular industries or 
branches. The Conservative and Social Democratic Parties on their side argued for a more interventionist 
policy. In the end, the idea of using industrial policy, to foster structural adjustment and thus international 
competitiveness became of foremost importance for all parties. Moreover, the development of sectorally 
oriented technology policy signalled a move away from a traditional non-selective and non-interventionist 
industrial policy toward an industrial policy that involved a greater directive role for the government. This shift 
was also reflected organizationally in the fact that significant changes had been made in the Ministry of 
Industry and elsewhere that led to the establishment of policy organizations oriented towards the 
development of industrial policy programs which again led to the formulation of new, more active and project 
oriented policy programs, in the development of which industry, organized labor and the most important 
political parties took part. 
 In the mid-1980s a broader definition of structural problems developed whereby discourse and policy 
organizations within the Ministries of Finance and Industry adopted the concept of “structural 
competitiveness” in which the competitiveness of Danish industry was seen as being dependent on a much 
wider variety of structural problems in the Danish economy that resulted not just in low R&D but an 
orientation toward producing for low-growth markets and a general lack of adaptative and innovative 
capacities in Danish industry. It was argued - mainly by The Ministry of Finance - that in order to resolve 
these problems coordinated efforts were needed in areas other than just industrial policy. There was also a 
need to reform state administrative and regulatory structures in several policy areas. 
 Furthermore, in 1986 a process of reorganization started in the Ministry of Industry. Several subsidy 
programs were terminated much against the will of LO and the administrative structure of the Ministry was 
changed to more closely approximate a corporate structure, that is, an administrative form based on the 
management principles of private corporations and intended in part to improve the efficiency of industrial 
policy. Initiatives to these changes were taken by higher ranked public servants inside the Ministry of 
Finance and Industry many times in conflict with organized labor and the Social Democratic Party then in 
opposition. A few years later and in tandem with these changes in the Ministry, several private and 
semi-public industrial and structural policy organizations began to emerge in an effort to expand the scope of 
structural policy. This time members of the Social Democratic Party were to become active participants in 
developing a new and more interventionist industrial policy strategy. For instance, the Forum for Industrial 
Development was founded in 1988 and comprised of representatives from firms, institutional investors, trade 
unions, and other private organizations as well as civil servants known for their social democratic leanings 
and members of the inner circle of the Social Democratic Party. It sought to put issues of industrial 
restructuring on the agenda and later also pushed for broader issues, such as welfare state reform. Indeed, 
during the late 1980s there was an explosive growth in local and regional industrial and structural policy 
initiatives that were favored by groups representing a broad selection of actors, including public agencies, 
industrial associations, R&D institutions and private firms (Pedersen et al. 1992; Amin and Thomas 1996). 
 Throughout this period a number of neoliberal ideas and distinctions were introduced into the structural 
policy debate. One was the notion that state subsidies to industry presented “barriers” to adaptability and 
therefore competitiveness. Another was the idea pushed forward by The Federation of Industry that public 
regulation had adverse effects on private firms. Still, it was not public regulation per se that was seen as the 
problem, but rather a particular form of regulation that posed barriers to industrial adaptation and 
competitiveness. As a result, ministries, policy agencies and other administrative bodies relevant to industrial 
performance were not to withdraw from their activities, but to reorganize according to the needs and 
practices of industry and other relevant economic actors. Thus, on the one hand, implementation of the 
corporate model in the Ministry of Industry was designed not so much to liberalize or deregulate industrial 
policy but to improve its efficiency. On the other hand, public bodies were to become more goal and market 
oriented, and open to dialogue with a more inclusive group of private actors as well as other public bodies.   
 Discourse organizations within the Ministries of Industry and Finance as well as the the Economic 
Advisory Council, a campaign organization, took part in formulating the framework for a structural policy that 
transcended the area of industrial policy, which had preoccupied policy makers during the previous period, 
and entailed the coordination of industrial policy with other policy areas, such as labor market and R&D 
policy, administrative reforms in the public sector and changes in issue-areas like training and employment 
policies (Kongshøj Madsen 2003). In a series of policy publications the need for economic growth and 
structural adjustment was linked to initiatives that emphasized much closer coordination between various 
issue areas and between public and private actors with respect to industrial development, research, 
education, labor mobility, etc. The key problem of Danish industry in this interpretation was not only its low 
degree of technological development but also its inability to adjust to new positions of strength in the 
international competitive environment. In order to develop policy to facilitate this end increased dialogue 
between various public and private actors was called for. The key actors in this regard were several sector 
ministries and a variety of firms, industries and other private actors.  
 Around 1990 the conception of structural problems shifted from being oriented toward barriers to growth 
and adaptation in Danish industry to being oriented toward the adaptation of Danish society as a whole—
both the public and private sectors—to a challenging future in a world of European integration and economic 
globalization. The new conception of structural policy was one of a much more continuous, simultaneous 
and, importantly, integrated structural adaptation of the public and private sectors. This was foreshadowed 
by the development of public sector and structural policies since 1985 and points to how participants in the 
ongoing deliberation learned from past conflicts and experiences to develop strategies through incremental 
and pragmatic changes in already formulated common understandings. New socioeconomic problems were 
seldom formulated.  Instead, old ones were reformulated. Insofar as the public sector was concerned, 
specifically public expenditure policy and public sector modernization, the long term development of the 
public sector was now seen as the most important socioeconomic problem and was increasingly to be 
connected with the overall structural development of Danish society. Neither one could develop effectively 
without the development of the other. For instance, it was no longer enough to limit public expenditures and 
to make the public sector more efficient; one also had to consider the relationship between the public and 
private sector and the overall dynamics of development of society. In the context of structural policy the 
government became increasingly aware of the role of the public sector in facilitating the restructuring of 
industry. 
 The key actors were a multitude of both public and private actors at the national and local level that all 
shared responsibility for the continuous development and adaptation of the Danish economy. For a short 
period of time the Ministry of Finance came to play the important role of policy organization as well as 
campaign and discourse organization (Jensen 2003) with organized labor and organizations representing 
public employees pushed aside. With public sector modernization in focus, industry as well as labor became 
marginalized, and fights developed between the government and groups of public servants.  Hence, between 
1985 and 1993, policy conflicts often emerged between organized public employees and the central state’s 
top managers.  Structural policy now merged with public sector modernization policies and was oriented 
toward restructuring the boundaries between issue-areas and institutions on the one hand, and between the 
public and private sectors on the other. The objective of creating an efficient and adaptive public sector, 
which had been articulated in 1984 through the Administrative Modernization Program, was now linked to the 
goal of creating an adaptive and future oriented industrial structure in the private sector. The key problem 
and object of attention became the adaptation of Danish society to future developments in the European 
Union and the international economy. As a result, structural policy gradually became more macro oriented in 
the sense that it entailed not only coordination and restructuring in and between policy sectors but also a 
continuous restructuring of the entire Danish economy. 
 This was perhaps clearest in the area of public sector modernization policy. Here policies were 
institutionalized that attempted to consider the role and boundaries of the entire public sector. First, starting 
in 1990 Fiscal Policy Statements that were published by the Ministry of Finance began to treat questions of 
structural transformation and structural policy making as the overarching consideration toward which most 
other policies were oriented, including stabilization policies.  Second, several programs and plans were 
initiated to promote experimentation with new types of public sector governance and new relations between 
public and private bodies (Lægreid and Pedersen 1994, 1996; Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 1999).   
 In this third phase of structural policy development, drawing attention to the existing boundaries between 
state and economy as a socioeconomic problem, the macroeconomic efficiency of the entire public sector 
became a key ingredient in the formulation of structural problems and, consequently, policy and institutional 
reform. Of course, changing boundaries was usually seen as part of the new problem of improving structural 
competitiveness vis-à-vis European political and economic integration. Still, although emphasis on state-
economy boundaries was paramount in assessing structural problems, it was often more an issue of how to 
better coordinate and integrate policies and structures on each side of the boundary rather than sharpen and 
deepen the divide between public and private. The emphasis on the public sector then did not lead to radical 
changes in the understanding of socioeconomic problems, instead problems and topics were reformulated 
including new groups of participants into conflicts. Organizations representing public servants were to 
become major players together with private interest organizations representing local and regional authorities. 
As a result, while the structural policy gradually became more macro oriented the number of participants 
became more encompassing in the sense that the reformulated socioeconomic problems entailed not only 
coordination and restructuring in and between policy sectors but also a continuous restructuring of the public 
sector. Eventually, these reforms were institutionalized through experiments in contracting out the provision 
of public services to the private sector, various forms of public utility privatization, and establishing 
contractual arrangements between ministries and government agencies. Again, however, these initiatives 
were articulated as part of a broad program to resolve structural problems by improving the adaptive 
capacity of Danish society as it coped with increased European integration and competition. For example, 
the need to liberalize particular regulated industries was motivated by the problem of competitiveness and 
the potential for development in related industries as well as by the anticipated trend toward liberalization 
that would eventually be required by the European community. Furthermore, experiments with contracting 
out were not seen as ends in themselves but as part of a broader set of structural policies (Andersen 1997) 
following the line of development in the ongoing formulation and reformulation of socioeconomic problems 
since the 1970s. 
STRUCTURAL POLICY: A GENERALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 To review briefly, during the 1980s and 1990s a structural policy was formulated. It developed as part of 
the discursive history of the Danish polity after 1945, and particularly after 1975.  In more than 25 years the 
structural policy gradually became macro-oriented in the sense that it entailed not only coordination and 
restructurering in and between the private and the public sector, but also a continuous restructurering of the 
entire Danish economy. First, it came to be distinguished from Keynesian demand-side politics by 
emphasizing the supply-side as an ideal point of departure for economic policy making. Second, it focused 
on the boundary between public and private sectors and emphasized liberalization—that is, restoring market 
relations and removing obstacles to free competition. Third, it entailed attempts to introduce market 
principles of organization in the public sector either by moving functions from the public to the private sector 
and removing restrictions on the operation of private markets or by marketizing the public sector through 
reforms that created or simulated competition among public institutions or depoliticized or individualized 
decision making in and around public institutions. Fourth, it was distinguished from traditional industrial policy 
by emphasizing the coordination between industrial restructuring and reforming of the public sector. This 
conception of structural policy is one of a continuous, simultaneous and integrated structural adaptation of 
both the public and the private sector. It looks upon the reorganization of the public sector as a prerequisite 
for restructuring industry; and it looks upon the restructuring of industry as a prerequisite for making the 
Danish economy internationally competitive.  
During the gradual development of structural policy a multitude of both public and private actors at the 
national and local level were integrated into a generalized system of negotiations making all of them 
responsible for the continuous development and adaptation of the Danish economy. Based on the 
socioeconomic discourse a generalized system of negotiations was established enabling multiple actors in 
the private as well as in the public sector to adjust and change structural elements in the economy and to do 
it in an unremitting way. During these 25 years of policy development new organizations evolved as a result 
of deliberations and learning. Policy organizations together with campaign and discourse organizations 
played an important role in the sense that they enabled actors to read changes in the international 
environment as socioeconomic problems and to turn specific and individual questions into collective 
challenges. The ability of these organizations to establish joint interpretations of statistics and events and to 
translate them into collective socioeconomic problems was paramount for learning and flexibility. The 
ongoing deliberation made it possible for collective actors: (1) to develop structural policy as a national 
political project gradually involving more policy sectors and integrating additional public and private actors; 
(2) to go through several phases of reformulation of a structural policy without radically changing precedent 
understandings but reformulating these in the view of past experiences and present readings; (3) and to do 
so in an incremental way by establishing consensus among the most important social partners based on joint 
interpretations and understandings of socioeconomic problems. Thus, Denmark learned to change to 
structural policy and learned that it needed to change institutions to do that too.  
During this history of learning and flexibility a generalized system of negotiations was established 
capable of: (1) in terms of content to settle conflicts of distribution between private and public sector, central 
and local state, labor and capital by establishing nationwide organized negotiations; (2) in terms of process 
to link an increasing number of issue-areas by sequencing negotiations at the national level with negotiations 
at the levels of policy sectors, local state agencies and individual firms; (3) in terms of procedures to allocate 
representational privileges among social partners by ongoing organizational and institutional reforms; (4) in 
terms of mechanisms to develop new and reform old means of policy formulation, campaign tactics and 
negotiation strategies in the light of past experiences¸ and (5) in terms of agency to establish the 
prerequisites for strategic games among collective actors (Traxler 1997).  Let us look at each of these five 
issues in turn. 
Organizing negotiations: From the end of the 1980s three organized set of negotiations were established 
involving the parliament, the government, peak organizations and organizations representing local 
(Kommunernes Landsforening) and regional authorities (Danmarks Amtsrådsforening). The first of these 
were negotiations concerning public budgets. Here in a first step every minister negotiates budgets for his or 
her issue-area with the Ministry of Finance but also with institutions beneath the ministry (departments and 
directorates); in a second step the government negotiates the state budget with parties in the parliament 
(Finanslovsforhandlinger) agreeing on long as well as short-term goals for the public sector. The second of 
the organized negotiations were negotiations concerning distributional packages. Here the state budget sets 
cost limits for negotiations between the government and the local authorities while deciding productivity 
goals for public organizations and policy targets for welfare institutions (Kommunaløkonomiske 
forhandlinger). Both sets of negotiations take place every year but also set cost limits for a third set of 
negotiations – wage negotiations taking place every second year between peak organizations in the public 
and the private labor market. Lower level negotiations are sequenced in accordance with the rhythm of the 
three organized negotiations which sets limits on and policy targets for issue-oriented negotiations at various 
levels such as the joint shaping of national policies (labor training, social policy, employment, etc.), sectoral 
wage bargaining and negotiations at the plant-level regarding working conditions. Hence, by organized 
negotiations social partners representing all major collective actors link distributional packages (covering 
incomes policies, pensions, taxation and social security) to productivity goals (for the public but also the 
private sector) and set long- and short-term cost limits for the whole economy. The Ministry of Finance takes 
part as a powerful participant in all organized negotiations. The Ministry is also in charge of the arbitration 
and sanctioning organizations conciliating and sanctioning breaches of agreements.  
Interlocking negotiations:  Among the issue-areas being linked and sequenced, wage- and incomes 
policy measures were probably the most important. For year’s wage- and incomes policy had been one of 
the favorite macroeconomic instruments according to the demand-side orientation of the socioeconomic 
discourse up to the 1980s. From the end of the 1980s a peculiar institutional arrangement in the labor market 
made it possible for the government and the peak-organizations to manage the wage formation by 
consensus mobilization, bi- and tripartite negotiations, and inter- as well as intra-organizational control of 
members. Indirect guidance and control of wage formation rather than discretionary intervention by the 
government was increasingly used to adjust nominal wages to changing macroeconomic conditions. 
Negotiations in the public labor market were organized according to the rules of the private market and 
negotiations for both markets were sequenced so that the Ministry of Finance was able to control and 
manage wage- and income developments for all employed in the Danish economy within cost limits decided 
by state budget negotiations. The institutional flexibility involved was based on the willingness of the 
organizations (both in the private and the public labor market) to implement wage limits without government 
interventions. Negotiations dealing with wage formation became closely mixed with issues like cost-of-living 
escalators, introduction of new technology, work time reductions, decentralization- and individualization of 
pay-agreements and job security. 
A second issue-area to become locked into the generalized system of negotiations was labor market 
policy. From 1982 to 1989 a new labor market policy was attempted, and in the 1990s four labor market 
reforms were implemented decentralising policy measures to regional corporatist bodies involving both local 
and regional authorities, trade unions and employer’s organizations and to the plant-level involving firm 
management, employers organizations and shop-stewards (Jørgensen 2002; Madsen this volume; Martin 
2003). The intention was to restructure the composition of the labor force and its flexibility through pre-
employment and on-job-training programs. Today education and re-training are considered the primary cure 
for adjusting the labor force to changes in the global economy. Administrative reforms in the public sector 
became a third issue to be locked into the system of negotiations. Uncontrolled public expenditures and 
heavy tax burdens were for years one of the major macroeconomic problems. Expenditures came under 
control due to strict austerity measures put forward by the government in the 1980s. New models for 
managing and controlling the public sector were introduced and during the 1990s unions representing public 
employees were forced to accept austerity and modernization measures and a new set of bi-partite 
institutions was created making it possible for the government (in several instances in collaboration with the 
organizations) to develop new means for reorganizing the public sector through programs for privatization, 
deregulation, out-sourcing, and decentralization of wage formation to public organizations and individual pay 
agreements (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). 
Allocating privileges: Organizing and interlocking negotiations involved the building of new arenas for 
political exchange and the establishment of new organizational privileges for collective actors. New arenas, 
like the regional corporatist institutions and negotiations at the plant-level, were established for collective 
bargaining (Martin 2003; Madsen this volume). New actors, like organizations representing public employees 
or top managers in the public sector, were included in nationwide negotiations (Lægreid and Pedersen 
2001). In other words, new privileges were established and autonomy and authority was spread across 
private and public institutions and decentralized to the regional, the local and the plant level. The delegation 
of power and influence was part of the political exchange in which socioeconomic problems were 
reformulated; and the discursive shifts, then, were followed by the linking of a number of issue-areas, the 
building of negotiation organizations covering the national economy, and the integration of a growing number 
of collective actors able to influence the policy process from policy design (policy-, campaign and discourse 
organizations), via policy negations (negotiation organizations), to implementation. According to Treu (1992), 
this has led to more developed forms of concertation in the sense that the number of participants involved 
was increased (quantitative integration) and the number of policy areas linked were amplified (qualitative 
integration). Compared to the traditional wage- and incomes policy forms of corporatism and collective 
concertation the generalized system of negotiations is embedded in the collective understanding of more 
(instead of less) encompassing types of socioeconomic problems and is based on generalized (instead of 
isolated) negotiations. In the Danish case the institutional shift from traditional corporatist arrangements 
towards generalized negotiations was based on the dynamic change of collective understandings.  The 
corporatist arrangements were not reduced or undermined, but were extended and adapted (Molina and 
Rhodes 2003).  
 Changing mechanisms: Throughout the establishment of this generalized system three rather basic 
mechanisms came to play a particularly important role in all the processes we have described above: 
problem formation, codification, consensus building. These three mechanisms facilitated collective learning 
and each underwent significant change during the 1980s linked, in part, to the gradual introduction of 
structural policy into Danish discourse and understanding of socioeconomic problems (Kjær and Pedersen 
2001). 
 First, the collective construction and articulation of socioeconomic problems was to become a central 
feature of the Danish negotiated economy. This is referred to as the problem formation mechanism. During 
the 1980s and early 1990s there was a fundamental change in how problems were perceived and 
formulated. During the early 1980s problems were defined in terms of the past. For example, it had long 
been assumed that policy ought to be directed toward maintaining an ideal socioeconomic balance reflected 
in measures such as balanced budgets. Under these discursive conditions what was perceived as 
problematic and requiring explanation, evaluation and policy management were the factors that moved the 
economy away from the desired balance. However, during the early 1990s problems were defined much 
more in terms of the future. Specifically, the concern was how the national economy and its position vis-à-vis 
other national economies related to the future development of markets and political structures, including the 
development of the unified European market project as well as the more general globalization of economic 
activity. What had to be articulated now were an imagined future and the associated problems that might be 
anticipated with it. Consequently, the policy process became more preoccupied with definitions, predictions 
and anticipatory strategies for future problems than descriptions and explanations of past and present 
conditions.  
 Second, in the generalized system actors came to verbalize conflicts and disagreements, articulate 
interests, coordinate behavior, modify courses of action, create strategies for actions and ultimately codify 
decisions through negotiation. This is referred to as the codification mechanism. Two important 
developments occurred here. On the one hand, whereas codification initially occurred within fairly stable 
cognitive and institutional frameworks it now took place within more open-ended bounds due partly to the 
more future oriented nature of problem formation. On the other hand, codification became professionalized. 
For example, in order to become a participant in the structural policy debate actors now had to legitimize 
themselves by reference to being familiar and comfortable, if not masterful, with particular and somewhat 
exclusive bodies of scientific knowledge. Among other things, this professionalization was mirrored since the 
late 1980s in the sharply increasing number of discourse, policy and campaign organizations in ministries 
and interest organizations and financial institutions (pension funds for example). The form of writing in many 
reports published by these institutions increasingly resembled the style of more scientific publications.  
 Third, a key element of the system was to become the consensus mechanism. Here the formulation of 
problems and coordination of behavior is made possible and constrained by the continuous production of a 
basic and widely shared understanding of the situation — the socioeconomic problem — among all 
participants engaged in the articulation and negotiation of problems and solutions. In the early 1980s this 
process was closely linked to a traditional corporatist type of institutional arrangement that included bi-partite 
or tri-partite consultations in various policy fields. During this time a consensus on substantive policy 
prescriptions was a precondition for joint action. In other words, only those prescriptive measures to which all 
parties could agree were enacted as official policy. However, beginning in the early 1990s there was less 
emphasis on consensus over substantive matters and more on methods and procedures for devising policy 
prescriptions and delegating power and influence. Hence, there has been a shift from substantive to a kind of 
procedural consensus marked by the establishment of a generalized political system for negotiations. 
 Strategic games: The generalized political system of negotiation was constituted in an incremental way 
by the contribution of many different actors with diverse and often short-term motivations. The system, 
though, developed to become much more than an instrument for preference formulation and decision-
making. More than anything else it developed to become a rationality context enabling actors to validate their 
specific interests in the view of mutual interests; to evaluate their short-term interest in the view of long-term 
consequences; and to negotiate social pacts and policy packages based on the rules of log rolling and the 
like. During the development of the generalized system of negotiations political exchange became 
embedded in strategic games of inclusion and exclusion of both participants and problems. At some point 
conflicts developed into the formulation of socioeconomic problems as well as the distribution of 
organizational and institutional privileges, just as political exchange came to be oriented towards an 
imagined future more than the reality of the present. The strategic gaming, then, came to be built on three 
different types of games: language games, negotiation games and round table negotiations. 
 In language games preferences and interest are formulated and reformulated and moulded into a 
common understanding of the socioeconomic situation based on which the negotiation game of inclusion or 
exclusion can take place. Language games developed during the 1980s based on the fact that ministries, 
peak organizations and financial institutions established their own discourse and campaign organizations 
with the purposes of positioning their specific understandings of socioeconomic problems on the public 
agenda and influencing the moulding of mutual understandings. During these years there was a fundamental 
change in how problems were perceived and formulated due to the gradual development of the rationality 
context for language games; socioeconomic problems came to be constructed, articulated and codificated in 
reports written in a semi-scientific style by discourse organizations. 
 While language games are about the reading of social events and interpretation of economic statistics 
and the inclusion and exclusion of problems, negotiation games deal with who is to participate in round table 
negotiations. Again, fundamental changes took place in the 1980s and 1990s. During the days of traditional 
neocorporatism, inclusion and exclusion was decided by the lawmakers and included actors were delegated 
influence by law. In the system of generalized negotiations inclusion and exclusion is part of the gaming and 
the game is based on the rules of coalition making and log rolling. 
 The same goes for round table negotiations. Here the government and local authorities in collaboration 
with organized interests and financial institutions engage in concrete negotiations developing compromises 
on problems and solutions based on the outcome of language games and negotiation games. In round table 
negotiations bargaining is founded on common understandings of the socioeconomic problems.  Those 
invited are only those who have shown an interest in signing agreements based on a mutual understanding. 
Excluded actors are left with the possibility to influence negotiations only by lobbying, media campaigns, or 
other forms of interfering with the negotiations from the outside. 
 In sum, although negotiated economy has always been a unique form of collective learning that 
contributed directly to policy and institutional change, key elements of this — content, process procedures, 
mechanisms and agency - changed as structural policy became a major political project in the Danish 
context. However, it is important to recognize that these changes were themselves driven, at least in part, by 
the introduction of the policy. In other words, as a new political project was incorporated into discourse, it 
began to have significant effects on content, procedures, processes, mechanisms and agency. A 
generalized system of negotiations was built and neocorporatism transformed. In this way the social partners 
have proven to be capable of verbalizing experiences and transforming institutions and organizations based 
on perceptions of changing macroeconomic situations and conditions. Also, they have proven themselves 
capable of formulating a national strategy for structural change, technological renewal, and modernization of 
the public sector and of achieving broad acceptance of this among multiple collective actors and in the 
population in general. 
 This transformation of neocorporatist arrangements involved the selection and displacement of 
socioeconomic problems as well as the triggering of shifts in policy orientations and shifts in the distribution 
of organizational and institutional privileges. For example, the three mechanisms (problem formation, 
codification and consensus making) contributed to the selection of new political-economic ideas in the sense 
that they determined what ideas and issues could fit into or become part of the learning process. Notably, the 
problem formation mechanism ensured that only issues and ideas that could be defined as socioeconomic 
problems could become part of the discussions about structural policy. Thus, the issue of supply-side 
structural barriers to industrial growth became part of the existing economic policy discourse because it was 
possible to formulate this issue as a socioeconomic problem. Once the supply-side orientation had been 
introduced, it transformed the policy orientation by opening up a whole new range of possibilities for 
rearranging processes, procedures and agency. 
 The introduction of structural policy into the Danish policy discourse also displaced certain elements of 
the learning process. For example, the neocorporatist arrangements were altered by the introduction of a 
new set of arenas for negotiation and by a new set of collective actors. This led to the expansion of formal 
procedures of participation in policy negotiation and consensus building. The initial conjunctural perspective 
on socioeconomic problems, especially that which focused on problems associated with business cycle 
fluctuations, entailed a stable pattern of bi-partite or tri-partite interest representation in negotiation because 
these were problems to be dealt with through well-established wage negotiation institutions. However, 
problems of structural competitiveness were more complex, involved a multiplicity of structural difficulties that 
could not be handled in one negotiation arena, and required a more integrated approach spanning several 
arenas as well as multiple levels and departments of government. This precipitated a revision of negotiation 
organizations, notably the inclusion of a wider and often shifting set of participants, such as representatives 
from R&D institutes and new government agencies and municipalities, as noted earlier. 
 Finally the introduction of structural policy triggered a shift in attention toward new aspects of reality, 
made possible new ways of conceptualizing problems and solutions, and created possibilities for new types 
of political action and intervention based on strategic games. For example, the emphasis on structural 
competitiveness shifted policy makers’ attention from current to future structural and organizational 
constraints in the economy. This led to changes in the agency of actors, which increasingly emphasized the 
strategic aspect of political exchange and the importance of inclusion and exclusion of problems as well as 
participants. In terms of macro economic policy, attention shifted from conjunctural business cycle 
fluctuations to the formulation of political projects or national strategies for the structural competitiveness of 
the whole economy. The formulation and implementation of national strategies became important and key 
elements of the traditional neocorporatist arrangements — content, process procedures, mechanisms and 
agency – were changed. 
CONCLUSION 
To recognize the importance of the negotiated economy is not to suggest that every small country can or 
will have to develop a similar institutional structure to guarantee economic prosperity. It is not even to 
suggest that the negotiated approach in the Danish case is the only factor to be credited for positive 
economic results. Denmark is not only a small country but also a little land with a relatively homogenous 
population, a developed democratic culture and, in particular, a small policy and political community drawn 
from a network of known educational institutions and families. A small elite makes up the Danish power 
networks.  Collaborators as well as opponents are linked through common educational experiences and 
institutions, institutional rotation, and personal acquaintances (Amin and Thomas 1996). 
Even then, I maintain that a national strategy has been formulated during the 1980s and 1990s leading 
to a reformulation of the socioeconomic discourse and profound changes in the articulation of socioeconomic 
problems. I also maintain that new policy instruments and organizations have been created, and that new 
possibilities for conflicts and consensus have been established by the creation of a rationality context for 
strategic gaming. These achievements, however, ought not to divert attention from the problems and 
ambiguities. The emergence of a structural policy is a rather new phenomenon, and questions remain as to 
its implementation. Only a patchwork of policies has been implemented.  And even if a generalized system of 
negotiations has been created many policy fields are not (yet) interlocked with these negotiations (see Hull 
Kristensen in this volume).  Also, strained relations have developed between the government and public 
organizations when distributional packages and productivity goals were to be implemented at the local and 
regional level. Even the restructuring of the industrial sector has proven to be more difficult than expected 
mostly due to fierce resistance from certain branches and single companies reacting to being enrolled in the 
overall strategy of the structural policy.  
The overwhelming complexity of a negotiated economy is another of the many reasons why the national 
strategy is still vague and probably will continue to be.  Yet another reason is the particular character of the 
generalized system of negotiations built as it is on the autonomy of all participants and on deliberation and 
persuasion as instruments of regulation rather than state authority and state planning. A third reason is the 
small and open character of the Danish economy. In times of European and global changes small and open 
economies are forced to enter a period of on-going adaptation and reformulation of perceptions and 
restructuring of organized privileges. The very limited size of their industries and their lack of political muscle 
force them to adapt to changes on the basis of technologies mainly researched and developed by others and 
within a political agenda generally controlled and formulated by others. Therefore, not only is a time lag 
between changes and adaptation to be expected, but the question of efficiency in adapting is also raised 
while the fluidity of institutions makes it difficult to establish the preconditions for how to measure the 
efficiency of an institutional regime. This helps explain why it is difficult to prove conclusively that the 
negotiated approach to policy making was primarily responsible for the impressive performance of the 
Danish economy in the 1990s (Kongshøj Madsen 2003).  
In this paper the key point has been that the articulation of socioeconomic problems and the founding of 
a generalized system of negotiation facilitate collective learning and policy flexibility in the Danish case. It 
has been argued that Denmark is especially well chosen for highlighting the discursive as well as the 
governance elements of institutions. It has also been argued that the Danish case is of special importance 
for the theory of corporatism because it shows that the post-war neocorporatist wage and incomes policy 
bargaining system described by others (e.g., Schmitter 1974, 1982; Katzenstein 1985; Therborn 1998) was 
adapted and extended rather than abandoned during the 1980s and 1990s (Molina and Rhodes 2002). 
Finally, it has been argued that the Danish case is of importance for comparative political economy because 
it constitutes an important and often neglected case of policy learning and flexibility, and points to some of 
the conditions that facilitate that learning and flexibility (Hemerijck and Schludi 2000, Teague 2000, 
Katzenstein 2002).  
However, an important question remains: How have the social partners been able to govern national 
changes through joint policymaking in a situation of on-going changes in the economic and political 
environment? To answer this question, we have to understand how policy organizations, discourse 
organizations, negotiation organizations, and other organizations evolved in the 1950s and 1960s to form a 
particular institutional framework for the evolution of the traditional neocorporatist arrangements to a 
contingent and emergent system of generalized political negotiations. While a system for generalized 
negotiations is the discursive and institutional precondition for a negotiated economy, the system itself can 
only be identified by understanding the discursive as well as the governance side of the system. Indeed, 
institutions consist of both discursive structures (i.e., cognitive and normative frames for perceptions of social 
events and readings of economic statistics), and governance structures (i.e., formal and informal rules and 
compliance procedures), and in order to understand how they function attention must be paid to both 
(Campbell and Pedersen 1996).  
I have subsequently argued that in the Danish case the discursive side of the system is especially 
important because the socioeconomic discourse makes it possible for actors to interpret and understand 
social events from the point of view of the same discourse and to come to mutually understand what kind of 
problems to look for and what kind of solutions to stretch to. The possibility for social actors to differentiate 
between systems is important for communication to be possible and for mutual understanding to develop 
(Luhmann 1981). The evolution of a socioeconomic discourse is an important factor in explaining how 
organized negotiations are part of a generalized system. It enables a special type of social actor (equipped 
with discourse- and policy organizations) to come to recognize certain social events and problems as 
socioeconomic problems. Thus, the socioeconomic discourse is not an overarching frame of meaning but 
one among several discourses framing social events; neither is it a general frame of meaning able to be 
portrayed in other than the Danish case. Rather it is a particular discourse evolved under certain historical 
conditions enabling social partners to act rationally while moulding specific interests into public interests and 
to implement national strategies while preserving their proper autonomy and authority. 
Following the same line of argumentation I have argued that the governance side of the system is 
important in explaining how organized negotiations are part of a generalized system. In the Danish case the 
mix of discourse- and policy organizations with negotiation and arbitration organizations makes it possible to 
combine the reformulation of socioeconomic problems with changes in policy orientation and in the 
distribution of organizational positions and privileges. The possibility of social partners to enter into strategic 
games and to mould interests by the mechanisms of problem formation, codification and consensus making 
enables them, on the one hand, to reach decisions on the basis of interaction between independent agents, 
where the relevant public authority is just one of several participants. The evolution of organized negotiations 
enables social partners, on the other hand, to coordinate decisions without hierarchy and to link levels of 
bargaining involving strong commitments through the sequencing of negotiations and the interlocking of 
issue-areas. 
Hence, the generalized system of negotiations encompass both discursive and governance elements.  
On the discursive side, it is a system based on a discourse that enables social partners to understand social 
events from the same cognitive and normative point of view.  On the governance side, it is a system that has 
evolved into a set of arenas for sequenced negotiation, which enable social partners to engage in political 
exchange through strategic games and to reach decisions based on their mutual autonomy and authority.  
In political science theories of pluralism and neocorporatism have been offered to explain policymaking 
in advanced capitalist countries.  The pluralist tradition originates from group theory according to which 
political groups are autonomous in relation to political institutions and a formal distinction is supposed to exist 
between the two. The neocorporativist tradition, on the other hand, originated from functional theories where 
it was assumed that political institutions and private organizations are no longer separated by a formal 
distinction.  Rather, stable and institutionalized relations among the two are established in an effort to make 
public decisions more efficient (Kastendiek 1981). Neocorporatism and pluralism differ in important ways 
from the negotiated economy.  First, while pluralist as well as neocorporatist theories focus on relations 
between organisations representing objective societal functions or interests I have stressed that interests in 
a negotiated economy are created or formed in language and negotiation games and that a generalized 
political system of negotiation can mould selfish interests into common understandings and, subsequently, 
into public interests. Second, while pluralist theory stresses the authority of public institutions and the 
autonomy of private organizations, social partners in a negotiated economy are autonomous but enter into 
collective decision making based on strong commitments by all participants to a shared socioeconomic ideal.  
Notable, also, is that fact that the government is only one among several participants in this decision making. 
Third, while neocorporatist theory focuses on special or single arenas for negotiations I have stressed the 
systemic and generalized character of organized negotiations that cut across and link these arenas. Fourth, 
while neocorporatist theories emphasize how state and other organizations are formally integrated, I have 
highlighted the often informal character of the strategic games that are involved. Fifth, I have shown how 
both governance and discursive organizations are important whereas the literatures on neocorporatism and 
pluralism neglect the discursive side.  Finally, while both pluralist and neocorporatist theories point to the 
stable aspects of relations among social partners, I have underlined the evolutionary and very dynamic 
character of a negotiated economy, which results in a high degree of institutional flexibility and learning 
capacity.  Especially in this sense, the Danish case is of special interest for comparative political economy 
because it is an important and often neglected case of policy learning and flexibility that is based on 
institutional arrangements that are quite different from the neocorporatist arrangements described by 
Katzenstein (1985) and others. 
In describing the Danish case of a negotiated economy I have underlined that social partners have built 
and transformed their institutional framework following a path-dependent, neocorporatist trajectory changing 
classic neocorporatism into a generalized system of negotiations (Molina and Rhodes 2002). Even if this 
resembles what Hemerijck (1995) in the Dutch case has described as a networked variety of economic 
governance, or what Traxler et al. (2001) have called a development from “classic” to “lean” corporatism, the 
Danish negotiated economy is a distinct mode of governance because of its systemic and encompassing 
character.  As such, it has to be recognised that complex and important discursive and other institutional 
differences can exist among the small, advanced capitalist countries that are often described collectively as 
neocorporatist or coordinated (Hall and Soskice 2002).  Indeed, given the right circumstances, some of these 
countries may evolve into something significantly different and more complex than the simple but telling 
dichotomy of liberal market economies and coordinated market economies discussed in chapter 1 of this 
volume.  Whether Denmark’s negotiated economy will continue to evolve in the face of new challenges, such 
as globalization and European integration, and especially during a period, in which international 
organizations like the EU, OECD, and World Bank, among others, strongly advocate neoliberal reform, 
remains to be seen. 
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